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The Lingering Threat: Explosive Remnants of War in Gaza


Among the myriad urgent issues awaiting resolution in Gaza, explosive remnants of war (ERW) stand out as a particularly vexing challenge. This term encompasses “dud” munitions, installed mines, abandoned weapons caches, and other explosives left behind during conflict. According to a senior official with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the complete removal of these remnants could take up to fourteen years, severely hampering Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.


The Dual Threat of ERW

The danger posed by ERW is twofold. Firstly, these remnants can maim, kill, or blind unsuspecting civilians who come into contact with them. Secondly, there is the potential for Hamas to recover and repurpose these explosives, thereby reconstituting its military capabilities. Until ERW are cleared, displaced residents cannot safely return to their homes, and the flow of humanitarian aid, agricultural activities, and commerce will be significantly disrupted. Historical precedents indicate that ERW can cause hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties long after active combat has ceased. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive plan that includes educating the population about ERW, treating injuries, and locating, detecting, disarming, and disposing of these explosives—all of which are resource-intensive tasks devoid of a technological silver bullet. However, no formal plans have yet been established for interim security in Gaza, let alone for clearing ERW.


Assessing the Scale

The exact scale of the ERW problem remains unknown due to the lack of transparency from both the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hamas. As of December, it was reported that the IDF had used between 30,000 and 40,000 munitions in Gaza. Assuming a standard failure rate of 10-15%, there could be as many as 6,000-9,000 unexploded Israeli ordnances in Gaza. This estimate might be conservative as it excludes artillery rounds, rockets, or mortars from the current conflict and remnants from previous wars.


Unlike other ERW clearance operations in the Middle East, such as those in Yemen and Lebanon, the urban nature of Gaza’s combat zones presents unique challenges:

  • Urban rubble varies greatly in depth, complicating estimates of costs, resources, and manpower needed for clearance.

  • The abundance of metallic debris unrelated to ordnance makes traditional detection methods like metal detectors and ground-penetrating radar nearly ineffective.

  • The simultaneous recovery of human remains in Gaza neighborhoods will further slow the ERW clearance process.

  • Hamas’s extensive tunnel network, which may contain booby traps and additional ERW, requires extraordinary caution.


Technological Advances and Their Limitations

The ongoing ERW clearance operation in Mosul, Iraq, highlights the potential benefits and limitations of technological advances. New technologies have expedited the clearance of critical infrastructure in Mosul while better protecting explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel. The use of 3D imaging and small aerial drones has allowed for safer and quicker identification of ERW.


Similar technologies could be beneficial in Gaza, provided funds are available. Clearance teams would need to coordinate closely with the IDF to prevent their drones from being mistaken for threats and to protect the security of IDF personnel. However, Gaza’s complex tunnel networks and dense urban rubble present challenges that Mosul does not.


Artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI-ML) currently have limited direct applicability to urban ERW clearance. Nonetheless, Gaza could serve as a valuable testing ground for these technologies, providing data to develop algorithms that could revolutionize the clearance process. For example, an AI-ML program could be trained to differentiate between various types of ordnance and rubble, enhancing detection accuracy.



Challenges of Data, Funding, and Oversight

Obtaining Israeli targeting data would significantly aid ERW clearance efforts. However, Israel is not a signatory to Protocol V of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which requires combatants to provide records of explosive ordnance used. Israel should consider providing this data as part of its support for Gaza’s recovery and stabilization, ensuring it is not misused against its interests.


Funding will also be a significant challenge. In 2023, UNMAS managed twenty demining programs worldwide, many of which were underfunded. For Gaza, an estimated $40-$50 million annually will be needed for ERW clearance—far exceeding current budgets. Israel, the international community, and Arab nations should prepare to share this financial burden. Similar to U.S.-funded ERW clearance efforts in Southeast Asia and Iraq, Israel should contribute to the effort in Gaza, enhancing its security in the process. Gulf states could also provide funding and technical expertise, potentially through UNMAS or another international entity.


Regarding oversight and execution, options include military EOD teams, contractors, humanitarian organizations, or trained locals. The Palestinian Authority’s mine action center is currently small and poorly equipped. Thus, UNMAS or a suitable NGO, funded by international donors, would need to supervise the demining effort in Gaza until local capacity is developed.


Conclusion

The ERW problem in Gaza is immense, and there is no easy solution for clearing and reconstructing a largely destroyed urban landscape fraught with dangers above and below ground. Several measures can ease the challenge, such as avoiding the use of cluster munitions, employing drones for reconnaissance, adhering to Protocol V principles, and urgently raising funds for ERW clearance. Technological and data collection advancements will also be beneficial.


However, clearance efforts cannot be truly effective without integration into a larger program of stabilization and reconstruction. Until there is adequate security or a long-term ceasefire, these efforts will be on hold. Over the many years it will take to clear ERW from Gaza, an authority will need to manage demining resources, prioritize their use, and provide security for personnel carrying out this crucial work.


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