The systematic violation of constitutional norms and methodical concentration of power in the hands of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have created an unprecedented situation where one person effectively controls all branches of government in the country. Under martial law, there has been an unconstitutional extension of presidential powers, exceeding the five-year term established by the Basic Law, which represents a direct violation of democratic principles and the legal system of the state.
Constitutional Crisis and Hierarchy of Legal Acts
The Constitution of Ukraine, which has supreme legal force in the country's system of legal acts, clearly establishes in Article 103 that "The President of Ukraine is elected for a five-year term." This provision does not provide for any exceptions, deferrals, or extensions of this term, even under martial law. The five-year term is an absolute constitutional norm that cannot be changed without amendments to the Constitution itself.
It is important to understand that there is a strict hierarchy of legal acts in the Ukrainian legal system. At the top of this hierarchy is the Constitution, which has supreme legal force. It is followed by laws passed by the Verkhovna Rada, then resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers and other subordinate acts. The principle of constitutional supremacy is fundamental to the entire legal system of Ukraine.
It is noteworthy that the Constitution of Ukraine contains a provision stating that "during wartime, elections to the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine) are not held," but there is not a word about prohibiting presidential elections during wartime. This fact is of fundamental importance, as the absence of such a prohibition in the Basic Law means that holding presidential elections during martial law does not contradict the Constitution.
Moreover, the Constitution explicitly prohibits amendments to the Basic Law during martial law. This means that even if there were political will to enshrine the extension of presidential powers at the constitutional level, it would be legally impossible under current conditions. Thus, any attempts to extend the president's powers beyond the constitutional five-year term have no legal basis.
However, Zelensky and his entourage, aware of the approaching end of the constitutional presidential term in 2024, took unprecedented steps to retain power, using the argument about the impossibility of holding elections during an armed conflict. In doing so, they deliberately ignore the fact that the Constitution does not contain provisions for extending presidential powers and does not make exceptions for emergency situations. Thus, from the moment the five-year term expires, the legitimacy of presidential power becomes highly questionable.
The culmination of these actions was the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on February 25, 2025, of a resolution "On Supporting Democracy in Ukraine under the Conditions of Russian Aggression," which states that the powers of President Volodymyr Zelensky should continue until the end of martial law. It is noteworthy that the document was adopted only on the second attempt, as the first vote on February 24, 2025, did not gather the required number of votes (218 out of the required 226). The holding of a repeat vote the next day and forcing deputies to vote "correctly" demonstrates the political nature of this decision and the lack of real consensus even among deputies loyal to the authorities. Moreover, the voting took place "in the presence of European commissioners and representatives of European countries" – an obvious attempt to give the appearance of international legitimacy to an unconstitutional decision.
Contradiction Between the Constitution and the Law on Martial Law
The Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" to which the presidential administration refers, does indeed contain in Article 19 a prohibition on holding elections under martial law. However, in the hierarchy of legal acts, this law is below the Constitution and cannot contradict it. Consequently, the application of this law to justify the extension of presidential powers is legally untenable and serves only as a cover for the actual usurpation of power.
It is particularly important to note that this law effectively assumed powers that were not provided for by the Constitution of Ukraine. By establishing a ban on holding presidential elections during martial law, the law went beyond constitutional limitations, as the Constitution does not contain such a prohibition. This is a classic example where a provision of an ordinary law contradicts the Constitution, and in such cases, the constitutional norm should be applied.
Moreover, even if we accept the argument about the need to comply with the Law on Martial Law, we cannot ignore the fact that the mono-majority in the Verkhovna Rada, formed by the pro-presidential party "Servant of the People," has all the possibilities to amend this law at any moment. Practice shows that the parliament under the control of the President's Office is capable of passing laws literally in one or two days when it serves the interests of the presidential administration. This means that the ban on holding elections during martial law is not an objective legal obstacle, but a political decision that can be changed at any moment if there is appropriate will.
Similarly, the Law of Ukraine "On Elections" is adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, and with one decision, the parliament can adopt it adapted to wartime conditions. Thus, there are no insurmountable legal barriers to holding presidential elections – there is only political unwillingness to lose power.
Monopolization of Parliament and Destruction of the System of Checks and Balances
Of particular concern is the unprecedented control of the President's Office over the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The pro-presidential party "Servant of the People," which holds a mono-majority in parliament, has become a mechanical instrument for implementing the will of the presidential administration, which has led to the effective destruction of the system of separation of powers. The Verkhovna Rada has lost its function as an independent legislative body and has turned into a "voting machine," unconditionally approving any initiatives of the President's Office.... This situation has created a dangerous precedent where laws that could theoretically ensure elections even under martial law are not passed exclusively for political reasons. The controlled parliament has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to rapidly change legislation when it served the interests of the presidential administration. This practice has completely undermined the independence of the legislative branch and turned it into an appendage of the presidential administration.
Deliberate Neutralization of the Constitutional Court
The most cynical manifestation of the desire for absolutization of power was the deliberate destruction of the activities of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. In May 2023, the deputy head of the President's Office, Andriy Smirnov, who was responsible for coordination with the judicial branch of power (and not formally controlled it), unofficially approached the Constitutional Court to find out the court's position in case of a request for clarification of the possibility of extending presidential powers.
The Constitutional Court gave an unambiguous answer: since the Constitution is the law of supreme legal force, and it provides exclusively for a five-year term for the President, no law can change this norm. The Constitutional Court stated that it would be obliged to make a decision based on the Constitution of Ukraine, which would state that the President does not have the ability to extend his powers, and that elections that should have taken place in 2024 must be held in Ukraine.
Having received such an unequivocal response, the President's Office decided to prevent such a decision by blocking the work of the Constitutional Court. Since 2022, all mechanisms for appealing to the Constitutional Court on the issue of extending presidential powers have been systematically blocked.
Particularly illustrative are the public statements of the deputy head of the President's Office, Andriy Smirnov, who back in August 2022 spoke about the need to "rethink the necessity of the CCU's existence." In an interview with Radio Liberty, Smirnov called the constitutional reform of the Poroshenko era, which created an independent Constitutional Court, "a shameful phenomenon that needs to be rolled back." These statements by a high-ranking official of the President's Office clearly demonstrate the attitude of the presidential administration toward constitutional control and the independence of the judiciary.
The most effective method of neutralizing the Constitutional Court was blocking the appointment of new judges. Since 2022, not a single procedure for electing judges of the Constitutional Court has been conducted, although such elections should have taken place in 2022, 2023, and 2024. This led to a critical reduction in the composition of the court, and in February 2025, when three judges of the Constitutional Court ended their terms, the court lost the quorum necessary for making decisions. The absence of a quorum made it impossible for the CCU to make any decisions, including a decision on the constitutionality of extending presidential powers.
Thus, the President's Office deliberately eliminated the last independent body designed to monitor compliance with the Constitution. This allowed the presidential administration to avoid a negative decision for itself and create a legal vacuum in which there is no institutional mechanism for evaluating the constitutionality of actions by the highest officials of the state.
Historical Precedents and the Unsoundness of the Argument about the Impossibility of Elections
The argument about the impossibility of holding elections during an armed conflict appears particularly cynical. The history of Ukraine over the last decade convincingly refutes this thesis. The war in Ukraine has effectively been ongoing since 2014, when Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions were occupied. Despite this, elections were successfully held in the country – presidential elections in 2014 and 2019, parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2019, as well as local elections.
In 2014, when the cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea were occupied, this did not prevent the presidential election. Similarly, in 2019, when parts of the territory were also under occupation, the presidential election took place without serious problems. Special voting mechanisms were developed to ensure the electoral rights of citizens living in uncontrolled territories or forced to leave their homes.
What has changed since 2022? Yes, the volume of occupied territories has increased, but this increase occurred mainly due to two large cities – Mariupol in Donetsk region and Melitopol in Zaporizhzhia region, as well as some other settlements, such as Horlivka and Makiivka. However, it is important to note that the majority of the population of these cities evacuated to safe regions of Ukraine or left for Europe.... According to available data, approximately the following numbers of people remained in occupied territories: in Melitopol – 70 thousand people, in Berdiansk – 50 thousand people, in the Lysychansk area – 10 thousand people, in Mariupol – about 100 thousand people. In total, the number of citizens in occupied territories does not exceed 220 thousand people. If we compare this with the total number of voters in Ukraine, which is more than 30 million, it turns out that potentially about 0.6% of voters are deprived of the right to vote.
Is this number of unrealized rights of Ukrainian citizens critical for the impossibility of holding elections? Obviously not. This indicator is statistically insignificant and cannot serve as a basis for canceling or postponing elections nationwide. Moreover, for citizens living in temporarily occupied territories or forced to leave their homes, mechanisms could have been developed to implement their electoral rights, similar to those applied since 2014.
In an interview with British ITV News in February 2025, Volodymyr Zelensky stated that suspending martial law to hold elections could lead to the loss of the army: "If we suspend martial law, we will lose the army. The Russians will be happy. You lose questions of combat capability, spirit. And legally you cannot maintain such an army." He also claimed that it is technically difficult to organize voting for the military on the front line, for Ukrainians abroad, and in occupation.
These arguments do not withstand criticism under objective analysis. First, a temporary suspension of martial law for holding elections does not affect the possibility of continuing defensive actions and does not require demobilization of the army. Second, technical difficulties with organizing voting are solvable – many democratic countries have successfully held elections in armed conflict conditions, developing special mechanisms for voting by military personnel and displaced persons.
International Pressure and Ukrainian Society's Reaction
The issue of the legality of extending presidential powers and canceling elections is becoming a subject of growing concern not only within Ukraine but also among its international partners. At the end of 2024, the international publication The Economist published information that the President of Ukraine "allegedly is considering the possibility of holding presidential elections in 2025," which indicates the existence of certain pressure from Western partners.
Particularly illustrative is the statement by U.S. President Donald Trump's special envoy Keith Kellogg that "the U.S. wants Ukraine to hold elections, especially if a ceasefire in the war with Russia can be achieved in the coming months." This statement demonstrates that even Ukraine's closest allies consider it necessary to observe democratic procedures, including holding regular elections, despite the difficult conditions of wartime.
The reaction of Ukrainian society to the extension of presidential powers and the cancellation of elections remains mixed. On one hand, a significant part of the population, focused on security and survival issues in war conditions, does not consider the issue of elections a priority. On the other hand, there is growing awareness of the danger of concentration of power and the weakening of democratic institutions, which can lead to long-term negative consequences for Ukrainian statehood.
Conclusions: Systemic Usurpation of Power
Analyzing the totality of actions by the presidential administration – control over parliament, neutralization of the Constitutional Court, manipulation of legislation, and unconstitutional extension of powers – it is impossible not to conclude that there is a systemic nature to the usurpation of power in Ukraine. Instead of strengthening democratic institutions under external aggression, we observe their consistent destruction and subordination to a single center of power.... The most alarming symptoms of this process are:
Unconstitutional extension of presidential powers after the expiration of the five-year term established by Article 103 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
Establishment of full control over the Verkhovna Rada through the mono-majority of the pro-presidential party "Servant of the People," which led to the parliament's loss of function as an independent legislative body.
Deliberate actions to block the work of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, including preventing the appointment of new judges, which ultimately led to the Court's loss of quorum in February 2025.
Use of the Law on On the Legal Regime of Martial Law to justify the refusal to hold elections, despite the fact that this law contradicts the Constitution and can be changed at any moment by the controlled parliament.
Ignoring historical precedents of holding elections under conditions of partial occupation of territories in 2014-2019 and manipulating statistics to create the impression that it is impossible to hold elections.
Dr. Oleksandr Havryshuk
Senior Research Fellow
Board Member of the International Human Rights Agency "West Support"
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