New York — When representatives from China, Russia, and Iran gathered in Beijing on March 15, the trilateral meeting was billed as a defiant stand against Western pressure over Tehran’s nuclear program. The resulting joint statement condemned “unlawful unilateral sanctions” and called for a diplomatic resolution — familiar refrains from past declarations. Yet, beneath the surface of this show of solidarity, the gathering revealed as much about the limits of their partnership as it did about their shared grievances with the United States.
With the partial expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.) looming in October 2025 — including the “snapback” mechanism that could reimpose United Nations sanctions on Iran — the meeting’s timing was no accident. For the Trump administration, now navigating a delicate path toward reining in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the strategic gaps between these three powers offer a rare opportunity. But exploiting them will require a nuanced understanding of their divergent interests, a lesson drawn from history and underscored by current dynamics.
A Flashback to 2006
The last time China and Russia appeared to align decisively against Iran was in December 2006, when both nations joined the U.N. Security Council in adopting Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on Tehran for its nuclear activities. The move stunned Iranian leaders, who had grown accustomed to Moscow and Beijing shielding them from international censure. It also paved the way for Resolution 1747 a few months later, tightening the screws further.
Yet that moment of unity was fleeting. China and Russia soon reverted to form, diluting subsequent sanctions and nudging Tehran toward moderation — a pattern they also applied to North Korea’s nuclear pursuits. Their cooperation stemmed less from a shared vision than from irritation with Iran’s refusal to negotiate seriously after a P5+1 offer in mid-2006. Today, as the J.C.P.O.A.’s deadlines approach, Washington might hope for a repeat. But the landscape has shifted.
China’s Balancing Act
For Beijing, the Middle East is less a geopolitical chessboard than a vital energy lifeline. Roughly half of China’s oil imports flow from the region, making stability a priority. This explains its role in brokering détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 — a diplomatic coup that burnished its image as a neutral player. While China has aided Iran in evading sanctions, its broader strategy is to avoid picking sides, a stance that limits its willingness to fully back Tehran’s nuclear gambit.
This neutrality could be a lever for the United States. Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil — and its aversion to regional conflict — might make it amenable to a deal restricting Tehran’s access to oil revenues, provided Washington offers trade or diplomatic concessions in return. Such an arrangement would be fraught with complexity, requiring careful monitoring to ensure compliance without derailing China’s energy needs. Still, it could give the U.S. significant bargaining power in future nuclear talks.
Russia’s Evolving Stake
Moscow’s calculus is starkly different. Unlike China, Russia has little interest in safeguarding Middle East energy flows; the region’s oil and gas exports compete with its own. Historically, its relationship with Iran has been transactional — a tool to extract concessions from Washington. In 2010, for instance, Russia backed Security Council Resolution 1929 on Iran’s nuclear program after the Obama administration unfroze a U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation pact.
But recent years have hinted at a deeper shift. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Iran has emerged as a key supplier of drones and missiles, cementing a military partnership that outlasted their joint support for Syria’s Assad regime. Assad’s fall late last year left Moscow searching for a new regional anchor, and Iran fits the bill — despite a history of mutual suspicion, as seen in the 2016 uproar over Russian use of an Iranian air base. This growing alignment raises questions: Is Russia now too invested in Tehran to play the honest broker it once did under the Biden administration?
The answer matters. A Russia keen to shield Iran from U.S. or Israeli military action — especially after its own battlefield setbacks in Ukraine — could complicate American efforts to enforce a nuclear ceiling. Any mediation offer from Moscow, such as its recent overtures under President Trump’s encouragement, should be met with skepticism and strict conditions.
Policy Pathways for Washington
As the J.C.P.O.A.’s expiration nears, Tehran is likely to lean on its partners to fend off snapback sanctions or military threats, offering tepid concessions to buy time. China and Russia have already signaled their approach, siding with Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency to block resolutions demanding full cooperation with inspectors. This echoes their playbook from 2002 to 2005 — until they relented in 2006 under mounting pressure.
The Trump administration could disrupt this cycle by setting clear red lines: military action if Iran builds a bomb or exits the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with escalatory moves like ending I.A.E.A. oversight. Such warnings might compel Beijing and Moscow to restrain Tehran, preserving its current “threshold” status — capable of a weapon but stopping short of one. Neither power wants a nuclear-armed Iran, as their March 15 statement reaffirmed, yet both resist dismantling its nuclear infrastructure outright.
A bolder move would target Iran’s oil lifeline to China. A quiet deal to cap Tehran’s revenue access — even as oil flows continue — could squeeze Iran economically while testing Beijing’s willingness to trade Middle East stability for U.S. goodwill. Russia, meanwhile, might demand Ukraine-related sanctions relief for its cooperation, a risky proposition given its tightening ties with Iran.
The Road Ahead
The Beijing meeting may not have produced breakthroughs, but its symbolism was potent: three nations united in defiance of Washington. Yet their unity is more fragile than it appears. China’s need for stability and Russia’s shifting priorities offer openings for the United States — if it can navigate the delicate balance of coercion and compromise. With the J.C.P.O.A.’s clock ticking, the next few months will test whether history repeats itself or veers into uncharted territory.
Sergey Nevstruyev
Project Director
March 25, 2024
